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We analyze the components of the bid-ask spread in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), which
was recently characterized as a developed market. For large and medium capitalization stocks,
we estimate the adverse selection and the order handling component of the spreads as well as
the probability of a trade continuation on the same side of either the bid or the ask price, using
the Madhavan et al. (1997) model. We extend it by incorporating the traded volume and we
ﬁnd that the adverse selection component exhibits U-shape patterns, while the cost component
pattern depends on the stock price. For high priced stocks, the usual U-shape applies, while for
low-priced ones, it is an increasing function of time, mainly due to the order handling spread
component. Furthermore, the expected price change and the liquidity adjustment to Value-
at-Risk that is needed is higher in the low capitalization stocks, while the most liquid stocks
are the high priced ones. Moreover, by estimating the Madhavan et al. (1997) model for two
distinct periods we explain why there are diﬀerences in the components of the bid-ask spread.
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In an inﬂuential paper, Madhavan et al. (1997) (MRR) showed that security prices change due (a)
to new arrival of public information, and (b) to the trading process. They pointed out that in-
formation asymmetry declines during the day, while transaction costs increase. In an independent
work, Huang and Stoll (1997) developed another structural model that incorporated all previous
approaches. Their empirical results supported the presence of a large order processing compo-
nent and a smaller adverse selection and inventory ones. Moreover, they argued that spreads are
depending on trading volume, a similar conclusion reached by Ahn et al. (2002).
This remark oﬀered the insight for the present paper, which goes on to provide an empirical
application to a small electronic order book market. Many researchers have used transaction
volume as an explicit variable to model spread components. Easley and O’Hara (1987), in an
inﬂuential theoretical paper, predict that informed investors prefer to make large trades. Hausman
et al. (1992) conducted a probit analysis to measure the eﬀect of several variables in existing
microstructure models. De Jong et al. (1995), showed that, for small trades, the Paris Bourse had
lower transaction costs than that of the London Stock Exchange and the cost of trading was a
decreasing function of trading volume. A year later, working on the Glosten (1994) model, they
provided evidence (De Jong et al., 1996) that, in the Paris Bourse, expected price change increases
with volume and accounts for 25% and 60% of the spread for small and large trades respectively.
They also used Hasbrouck’s (1991) VAR model and conclude that the permanent price impact eﬀect
was between 40% and 115% of the spread and hence the Glosten (1994) model underestimated the
transaction costs. Dufour and Engle (2000) also used and expanded Hasbrouck’s (1991) model by
adding the time between consecutive transaction to the exciting variables and argued that high
trading activity is positive associated with spread, volumes and price impacts, while Pascual et al.
(2004) showed that trading frequency increases after a trade with high information content and
therefore price discovery improves after such trades. Furthermore, Berkman et al. (2005) studied
the eﬀect of transaction volume on execution costs in the London International Financial Futures
and Options Exchange. They substantiated that eﬀective spreads are smaller in future markets
compared to the underlying market, a result that conﬁrms the main ﬁnding of Subrahmanyam
(1991). Moreover, Chan (2000) studied the price formation process on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange and pointed out that the information component was more important than the inventory
one. On the contrary, Bollen et al. (2004) developed and tested a model of market makers’ bid-
ask spread for NASDAQ stocks and concluded that the inventory cost component dominated the
adverse selection one.
On the other hand, many researchers examined the eﬀect of volume on spreads, execution
costs and order ﬂows. By studying the volatility-volume relationship, Chan and Fong (2000)
demonstrated that, for NYSE and NASDAQ stocks, traded volume was a more signiﬁcant variable
for volatility than the number of trades, but remained rather unclear on the main factors aﬀecting
this signiﬁcant variable. Ahn et al. (2002) and Huang and Stoll (1997) found that the order
processing cost decreases with traded volume. Degryse (1999) showed that total trading costs in
the Brussels CATS system, as compared to London’s, are lower (higher) for small (large) trade
1sizes and concluded that the relation between the eﬀective spread and trade volume depends on the
speciﬁc characteristics of the exchange. Easley et al. (1997) argued that large trades have almost
twice as much information as small ones, with buys and sells diﬀering only marginally. In contrast
to all of these ﬁndings, Aitken and Frino (1996) analyzed institutional trades on the Australian
Stock Exchange and pointed out that buy orders are associated with larger costs than sell orders,
probably due to short selling restrictions. Similarly, Chan and Lakonishok (1993) argued that the
higher permanent impacts that are observed after block purchases are result of the high cost of
short selling and the reluctance of investors to short sell stocks. For the Helsinki Stock Exchange,
Hedvall et al. (1997) reported that asymmetries in the order ﬂow depend on the traded volume
and pointed out that “there are more often information reasons behind large buy trades than large
sell trades”.
Several studies explore the behavior of the bid-ask spread components during the trading day.
Ahn et al. (2002) found that both the adverse and the order handling components of the Tokyo
Stock Exchange exhibit U-shape intraday patterns. Declerck (2000) studied the trading costs and
the spread components for the CAC 40 index stocks and found out that the order processing
explains 82% of the spread, while all its components are positively related to the traded volume.
Menyah and Paudyal (2000) showed that the inventory cost component is smaller than that of
the order processing one for the London Stock Exchange and the asymmetry of information cost
accounts for about 47% of the quoted spread, a percentage almost equal to that reported for
NYSE/AMEX stocks by Kim and Ogden (1996). The same authors also found that high Normal
Market Size (NMS)1 stocks exhibit higher asymmetric information than low NMS ones: market
makers widen the spread in order to limit expected losses from trading with informed investors.
Ke et al. (2004) examined the impact of tick size on spreads, volatility, autocorrelation and trading
volume and demonstrated that these variables displayed a U-shape pattern, while they showed that
a larger tick size is related to wider bid-ask spread. Chan (2000) and Brockman and Chung (1998)
studied intraday price formation of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and found that both price
impacts and spreads display the familiar U-shape patterns. Silva and Chavez (2002) reported that
the higher execution costs of the Mexican Stock Exchange can be attributed to a higher adverse
selection cost and not to the speciﬁc characteristics of stocks. Kim et al. (2002) analyzed the
SIMEX future contract on the Nikkei 225 index and reported an L-shaped intraday pattern for
the information cost and an inverse U-shaped one for the inventory holding cost. Gwilym and
Thomas (2002) used trades and quotes of the LIFFE FTSE100 futures contract and by examining
several measures of spread, they concluded that the spreads widen at the open and narrow at the
close of day, with transaction spreads being biased estimators of quoted ones. Last but not least,
two other studies examined the bid-ask spreads in option markets: Nord´ en (2003) used data from
the Swedish OM market and found that both in- and out-of-the money options are more asymmetric
than at-the-money ones, with the theoretical option value closer to the bid than to the ask price.
Pinder (2003) used data from the Australian Options Market to examine spread components both
before and after a switch from a quote-driven ﬂoor-traded system to an order-driven screen-traded
one. Among other things, he reported smaller spreads when market makers were providing bid-ask
1The minimum mandatory quote size for which market makers are obligated to post prices.
2prices continuously.
This paper applies well-known methodologies (Madhavan et al., 1997 and Glosten and Harris,
1988) to the estimation of the theoretical components of the bid-ask spread (adverse selection and
order processing costs) of the Athens Stock Exchange. We try to achieve two objectives in the
present paper: ﬁrst, we incorporate the volume as a variable to the structural model of Madhavan
et al. (1997) to examine the idea proposed by Ahn et al. (2002). The Athens Stock Exchange
(ASE) lends itself to such an exercise because a lot of listed stocks trade very passively for long
periods during the day, making the information asymmetry contained inside the sign traded volume
a more important factor than either the trade or the volume individually. At ﬁrst reading, we reach
similar conclusions to those of other researchers, since the adverse selection component exhibits
the familiar U-shape pattern. The cost component, however, displays a clear U-shape only for
high priced stocks and is monotonically increasing for low priced ones. These diﬀerences may be
explained in the volume-extended model, since the order handling cost eﬀect in low priced stocks
is smaller. Furthermore, the adverse selection component explains a signiﬁcant part of the spread
and is increasing with volume, while the cost component is decreasing in it. Therefore, looking
only at the latter component, we observe economies of scale in trading. During a distinct time
period, however, from June 1st to August 31, 1999, the cost component was the most signiﬁcant
part of the spread. At that time, it seems that there were mainly uninformed traders participating
in the market and, hence, the adverse selection risk was demoted. Second, by studying price
impacts caused by diﬀerent factors, such as order-ﬂow dependence, trade volume and market
capitalization, we conclude that high priced - high capitalization stocks are less sensitive to anyone
of these factors. Moreover, we show that the observed exception rates, in an out-of-sample study,
of a liquidity adjusted Value-at-Risk (L-VaR) measure, which is based on the augment model, are
closer to the expected ones than that of the MRR model. As it will be shown in the next sections,
these estimates (price impacts and L-VaR) can be calculated only by incorporating the volume as
a variable to the structural model of MRR.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section brieﬂy describes the
trading process of the ASE. Section 3 presents the data, while section 4 demonstrates the two
structural models, describes the estimation procedure and explains the results. Section 5 presents
and estimates the price impact and the L-VaR functions. The ﬁnal section concludes the paper.
2 The ASE Trading Process
The Athens Stock Exchange is the unique oﬃcial stock market in Greece. At the end of 2002,
approximately 375 companies were listed in it, with a total capitalization approaching e85.5 bil-
lion. ASE members include security brokerage houses, credit institutions and investment service
companies that have been granted a license by the Bank of Greece or by the Capital Market
Commission. Only ASE Members can execute purchase and sale orders for shares through the
Integrated Automatic Electronic Trading System (OASIS) of the market. Members are under the
obligation to (a) keep the ASE informed of their realized transactions on a daily basis, (b) keep
the Capital Market Commission informed on the use of their own funds, loans and shares on a
3weekly basis, (c) disclose to the same Commission their larger ﬁnancial exposure and solvency
ratio on a monthly basis, (d) issue transaction slips for all completed transactions and (e) follow
the accounting and tax laws.
Five diﬀerent market segments currently operate inside the ASE: (i) The Main Market, (ii) the
Parallel Market, (iii) the New Market (NEHA), (iv) the Greek Market of Emerging Companies
(EAGAK), and ﬁnally, (v) the Secondary Listings on the ASE from Stock Exchanges outside
Greece. The main classiﬁcation rule for any company to be listed in the ﬁrst four segments is
the amount of their own equity. For example, the minimum amount for the Main Market is
e11.7 million, while, for the parallel market, it is only e2.9 million.
Three major stock indices are calculated on a daily basis:
1. The ASE General, a market cap-weighted index, represents the general trend of the Greek
stock market and its composition criteria include capitalization, transactions value and shares
marketability.
2. The FTSE/ASE - 20 is the large Cap Index, featuring the 20 largest blue chip companies.
Companies are included in it on the basis of their capitalization and their free ﬂoat.
3. The FTSE/ASE Mid 40 follows the performance of the next 40 larger companies.
The last two indices cover approximately 2/3 of the total market capitalization of the ASE Main
Market.
Turning now to the discussion of the trading process, we can safely argue that the ASE is
basically an order-driven market, where members may continuously enter bid and oﬀer orders in
the system from 11:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. (the main trading period of the day). In such a setup,
liquidity is provided only through the entry of diﬀerent types of orders without the intermediation
of market makers. Orders are ranked ﬁrst by price priority and then on time arrival. In this way,
interests of buyers and sellers are served in the most eﬃcient way, while only after trade execution,
the member who entered the order can be informed about his counterparty’s identity. The tick
size allowed equals 1 cent of a euro for securities with a price up to e2.99, 2 cents for securities up
to e59.99 and 5 cents for the rest.
Inside each market segment, there are two diﬀerent trading mechanisms: the “instantaneous
market” includes all securities under regulatory surveillance or having “low liquidity” as classiﬁed
by the ASE authorities.2 For these stocks, order execution is serviced through ﬁve consecutive call
auctions during the trading day. For the rest of the listed stocks in that segment, orders are cleared
continuously from 11:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. In both mechanisms, all orders in the pre-opening period
(10:30 a.m.–11:00 p.m.) are cleared in an opening call auction.
2Since June 2003, all securities that in the last six months had an average relative spread greater than 2%, were
regarded as being rather illiquid. They cannot be a part of any oﬃcial ASE index.
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Transaction data used were drawn from intraday ﬁles of the ASE for the period from February
4, to December 30, 2002 and contains the time-stamped prices to the nearest second, volumes, and
bid and oﬀer prices with corresponding sizes just before a transaction occurs, for all transactions.
Our stock sample was based on the two major equity indexes, the FTASE-20 and FTASE-40,
representing the large and medium capitalization companies respectively. For each index, we
classiﬁed stocks in two independent groups: the ﬁrst one included those with an average sample
price greater than (or equal to) e10 and the second those with an average sample price less than
e103.
For all stocks opening transactions have been eliminated from the dataset, since the opening
period of the ASE is cleared as a call market.4 We also eliminated all trades where the bid was
greater than the corresponding ask, as well as those where the time stamp was clearly erroneous.
We also grouped all trades conducted at the same time and price as a single trade (Chan, 2000).
Lastly, given the fact all trades in this market involve a limit order stored on the limit order book
(the passive side) and a market order (the active side), the distinction between buyer-initiated and
seller-initiated trades is immediate.
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the four subgroups. Stocks in Group 1 are the most
active, based on trade intensity (180 transactions per day on average) and on average time between
trades (99 seconds). Their mean spread is e0.0368 or 0.19% of the bid-ask midpoint. Members
of group 2, high cap but low price stocks, are less liquid: there are fewer transactions per day
and their average spread (in percentage) is twice than that of the ﬁrst group. On the contrary,
for midcap stocks, it is not clear which subgroup is more liquid: trade intensity and time between
trades favour the low priced subgroup, while relative spread favours the high priced subgroup 3.
Overall, stocks in the midcap index are less actively traded than the corresponding large cap index,
as relative spread and time between trades are greater, while trade intensity is lower. We further
address this important issue in section 5.
We observe other essential diﬀerences between the two share groups. For example, the number
of transactions in the FTASE-20 stocks is almost twice as high as that for the FTASE-40 stocks,
while the relative spread is twice as low. These diﬀerences were tested using the non-parametric
Kruskal-Wallis test, a generalization of the Mann-Whitney test for more than two subgroups.5 For
both the absolute and the relative spread, the null hypothesis of all subgroups having the same
median has clearly been rejected. Table 2 presents results in detail.
Finally, table 3 shows summary statistics during the trading day: we use a shorter half-hour
interval after the opening and before the closing of the market and one-hour intervals in between.
3The members of each group and their average price are available from the authors upon request.
4Amihud and Mendelson (1987) pointed out that prices produced by such a call auction are likely to be generated
from a diﬀerent distribution than that of the rest of the trading day.
5For more details see Sheskin (1997).
5This divides the trading day in six intervals: 11:00-11:30, 11:30-12:30, 12:30-13:30, 13:30-14:30,
14:30-15:30, 15:30-16:00.6 For all groups, the hypothesis that the average and the relative spread
are equal during the trading day is rejected. Generally speaking, the mean and the standard
deviation of the spread and the mean relative spread display the familiar U-shape pattern over the
day, a result reported by several empirical studies. Especially for the ASE, Niarchos and Alexakis
(2003) reported that stock returns follow a U-shape pattern during the trading session. For group 1
(shown in panel A of the table), the average spread is almost 5 cents at the opening, drops to 3
cents in the middle of the day and increases back to more than 4 cents towards the closing. The
corresponding group of midcap stocks (panel C of the table) shows similar behavior, but with much
larger values. The same occurs for groups 2 and 4 (low priced stocks), though spread diﬀerences
throughout the day are not as large. Therefore, the highest trading costs in the ASE occur at the
beginning and the end of the day and, therefore, smaller private investors should focus on trading
periods in the middle of the day, as supported by the theoretical model of Admati and Pﬂeiderer
(1988).
4 Two structural models for intraday price movements
4.1 The MRR model
There are many decomposition methods of the bid-ask, such as Stoll (1989), George et al.
(1991), Hasbrouck (1991), Lin et al. (1995), de Jong et al. (1996), Huang and Stoll (1996), Huang
and Stoll (1997) and MRR. A recent study by Winne and Majous (2003) compares alternative
decomposition models on Euronext Brussels, an electronic order driven market too. All models
assign a negligible weight to inventory-holding costs. Under the assumption of zero inventory-
holding costs, all models report similar adverse selection costs estimates. They compare Huang
and Stoll (1997), Madhavan et al. (1997) and Lin et al. (1995) estimations with diﬀerent proxies
of information asymmetries, but they do not succeed in ﬁnding a superior methodology. Therefore,
we chose to work with MRR decomposition method among all the possibilities at hand, as it is
widely applied and there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the various methods.
4.1.1 Description and estimation procedure
We ﬁrst introduce the MRR model which will serve as a benchmark for our work. According to
that seminal paper, the factors moving prices are twofold. First, prices change due to the arrival of
new public information, which we assume to be a series of independent and identically distributed
random shocks with zero mean and constant variance. Second, the “order of trade” indicator
reveals informed traders’ beliefs, since a buy (sell) order is associated with an upward (downward)
price movement.
Let pt denotes the transaction price of the security at time t and Xt be the “trade indicator”
variable, equaling +1 if the trade is buy-oriented, and -1 if it is sell-oriented. The coeﬃcient φ ≥ 0
6We did not use a ﬁner time partitioning since thin trading caused lack of observations for statistically signiﬁcant
estimates of structural models for individual stocks.
6represents the cost per share of the market maker in supplying liquidity on demand, θ measures
the degree of information asymmetry and µt is the expected value of the stock. We assume a
standard cost model of market making, pt = µt + φXt, and an information asymmetry model for
fundamentals, µt = µt−1 + θ(Xt − ρXt−1). Combined, they produce the following intraday price
change model:
pt − pt−1 =( φ + θ)Xt − (φ + ρθ)Xt−1 + ut, (1)
where ρ is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of Xt. The pure random walk is a special case of 1 if
φ = θ =0 .
We estimate 1 by using the generalized method of moments (GMM) methodology, because it
does not require as strong distributional assumptions as the maximum likelihood methods. It can
also easily accommodate conditional heteroskedasticity of any form. The GMM method is based
on a moment condition, E(f(χt,ϑ 0)) = 0, where f(χt,ϑ 0)i saq × 1 vector function and ϑ0 is
a p-dimensional parameter vector. The estimated GMM parameters ( ˆ ϑT = argminϑQT(ϑ)) are
weakly consistent and asymptotically normally distributed and are calculated by minimizing the
function QT(ϑ)=fT(χt,ϑ) ATfT(χt,ϑ), where fT(χt,ϑ) is the sample mean vector and AT is the
sample symmetric weighting matrix. For equation 1, we set the following moments conditions:
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with α a constant. The ﬁrst condition deﬁnes the autocorrelation of the trade variable and the
last three are the normal OLS equations. We use the lagged trade indicator and a constant as
instrumental variables.7
4.1.2 Empirical results
Panel A of table 4 presents the GMM estimates of the MRR model and the corresponding
standard errors for each subgroup.8 We also report the p-value of a Wald within-index subgroup
equality test. Moreover, we calculate the implied spread, 2(θ+φ), and the proportion of it explained
by asymmetric information, γ ≡ θ/(θ + φ). This ratio is expected to be quite large, due to
anonymous trading, until trade execution at least. Anonymity is considered to increase information
asymmetry, as Foster and George (1992) showed: if traders are not fully anonymous and make their
motivations widely known, the bid-ask spread and the expected price change are expected to be
7Although, Madhavan et al. (1997) introduced one more conditional moment in order to estimate the probability
(λ) of a trade to occur between the bid and the ask price, this is not necessary in our dataset because all trades were
executed at either endpoint.
8The time series of the diﬀerent stocks in the same portfolio were stacked together. Panel B of table 4 presents
summary statistics on the parameters across the sample stocks. In all cases the average values are too close to the
reported one in panel A of table 4 and therefore, since our main ﬁndings do not alter signiﬁcantly, our analysis will
based on those of panel A.
7lower relative to a fully anonymous market.9 This conclusion is also supported by the work of
Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1991), where liquidity traders who preannounce the size of their orders
enjoy lower transactions costs.
We reach the same conclusion as Easley et al. (1996), who pointed out that, in less frequently
traded stocks, it is more common to observe more information-based traded risk. The percentage of
the spread attributed to the information component (i.e., parameter γ) is higher in the smaller cap
stocks (subgroups 3 and 4), as lower trading activity and, consequently, lower liquidity increase
the probability of dealing with an informed investor. Furthermore, as with Ahn et al. (2002),
this component is more important in high-priced stocks (γ is higher for subgroups 1 and 3). A
possible explanation is that, during 2002, only institutional investors were active in the Exchange,
dealing with high-priced stocks in a “bear” environment. Given that such investors are rather more
informed than private ones, spreads were increasing to take care of such cases. On the contrary,
since it is generally assumed that institutional investors are not interested in penny stocks as much,
the cost component received a higher weight for subgroups 2 and 4. We compute Wald statistics
to test for parameter equality in the subgroups of each index: in all cases, they are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent at all usual conﬁdence levels, revealing the importance of such partitioning.
Many researchers (cf. Ahn et al., 2002, Madhavan et al., 1997, Huang and Stoll, 1997) argued
that spread components and especially the adverse selection one, tend to be underestimated since
the elevated percentage of midpoint trades in US markets biases downwards the estimation of the
implicit spread. We calculate such bias to be between 21% and 30% of the quoted spread.10 One
explanation of this bias may be the breaking up of large trades into smaller ones. As trading
takes place continuously at the one side of the spread, pointing possibly to the fact that this side
is more liquid (exhibits larger depth), the spread, as a percentage of the midquote, seems to be
smaller, since the midquote converges to the trade price. Given that the implied spread is calculated
conditional to actual trades, trade asymmetry will cause the underestimation of the implied spread.
This is further supported by the probability of a trade reversal – from a trade at the bid (ask)
to a trade at the ask (bid) – being quite low.11 For example, the reversal probability for stocks
in group 1 is 35,34% and for group 3 is only 28,62%, a result reinforcing our belief that investors
prefer to execute a series of continuous trades at one side of the quotes.
Table 5 summarizes intraday estimations of spread components, calculates the implied spread
and presents the percentage of it explained by the asymmetry information for the six intraday
time intervals.12 We also report the p-value of a Wald test for diﬀerences between subgroups for
estimated parameters, showing all are signiﬁcant at all usual levels.
The autocorrelation coeﬃcient does not show any clear pattern during the day. We observe,
however, that its maximum value occurs in the last half hour, producing the lowest value for the
probability of a trade reversal at that same period. Positive autocorrelation has been reported by
9Also Bryant and Haigh (2004) reported that on commodity future markets spreads widen after the trading was
made anonymous.
10T h eb i a si sd e ﬁ n e da s1− (implied spread/absolute quoted spread).
11This probability, in the MRR structural model, is deﬁned as π =
1−ρ
2 .
12We have also estimated equation ( 1) by using ten time intervals instead, but results were similar.
8several authors (see Hasbrouck (1988, 1991), Madhavan et al. (1997), Biais et al.(1995) and Ahn
et al. (2002) among others) but the feature of the last half-hour is, to the best of our knowledge,
unique to the ASE and probably due to the increase in trading activity. As more investors are
coming late into the market and, simultaneously, the traded volume increases, the procedure of
splitting the trades increases the trade autocorrelation. For example, if an informed investor is
attempting to hide a large buy order at the last half-hour, he will choose to split it to smaller bits
in order to better conceal his motivation. Dufour and Engle (2000) reached a similar conclusion,
when they found out that higher trading activity is positively associated with trade autocorrelation,
volumes and spreads.
The adverse selection component, θ, for all groups, drops sharply after the ﬁrst 30 minutes, as
the trading process adds valuable information to all investors, pushing more uninformed traders
into the market. It then remains steady or declines slightly during the rest of the day, and increases
sharply again in the last 30 minutes. Informed investors come in to close up their intraday positions
just before the close, since by so doing, (a) they minimize risk, and (b) they proﬁt more easily
from superior information. Similar to Chan (2000), the increase of traded volume in the last time
period, would also lead to a larger adverse selection problem and, hence, widen spreads. Using
this argument, Chan (2000) explained the decrease (increase) of the adverse selection component
at the NYSE, as average volume decreased (increased).
An other possible explanation of the adverse selection component decrease after the ﬁrst 30
minutes may be the eﬀect of the opening of the US market on European stock exchanges. The
literature documents that the highest degree of information asymmetries in the US markets occurs
right after the opening (Madhavan et al, 1997). The opening of the US market coincides with the
afternoon trading in European markets. Since trading sessions overlap, the price discovery after the
US opening remarkably aﬀects the European afternoon patterns (e.g., Hupperets and Menkveld,
2002, Pascual et al., 2005). In the particular case of the ASX, the overlapping occurs during the
last half-hour of trading (15:30-16:00). Even if the close of ASE does not coincides exactly with
the opening of US markets, it might be aﬀected by the expectation of US or European investors
that are being revealed through the future markets.
On the other hand, the cost component φ does not behave uniformly but shows two diﬀerent
time patterns according to the average stock price. For high priced stocks (groups 1 and 3), it
exhibits a clear U-shape, while, for groups 2 and 4, it monotonically increases with time. This
is a striking result, since, under the MRR framework, there is no apparent reason behind these
diﬀerences. We will, however, see shortly that such diﬀerences may be explained in the extended
model.
4.1.3 Do these relations change over time?
The entire preceding analysis was done on the latest available intraday dataset from February 4
to December 30, 2002. We found that the adverse selection component (θ) had greater eﬀect on the
spread than the cost component (φ). It is interesting, however, to examine if this relation holds also
during a much diﬀerent historical period for the ASE. The new dataset covers the period from June
91 to August 31, 1999 and contains exactly the same variables: time-stamped prices to the nearest
second, volumes, bids and oﬀers with the corresponding sizes just before a transaction occurs. We
limited, however, our analysis only to the large capitalization stocks included in FTASE-20 index.13
The ASE authorities themselves, as do most of the Greek economic press and researchers, consider,
that the year 2002 was a very distinct period from the 1999 speciﬁc summer months for three main
reasons: (a) The level of the FTASE-20 index increased by 13% during this 3-month period, while
during the eleven months in 2002, it decreased by 38%; (b) more than 1 million small investors were
actively trading in the Athens Stock Exchange at that time, as opposed to a much lower number
for the latter period; and (c) the average, reported increase in pre-tax proﬁts of listed companies
in 1999 was 43%, compared to a 32% decline in 2002.
Table 6 displays GMM estimates (and corresponding standard errors) of the MRR model for the
2 subgroups of FTASE-20 stocks, for the 1999 dataset. As expected, estimated parameters diﬀer
between subgroups. The adverse selection component, θ, is close to zero for both subgroups, but
statistically insigniﬁcant for the second one. The cost component, φ, on the contrary, is signiﬁcant
at all usual conﬁdence levels and is more important than θ in deﬁning the spread, since γ is near to
zero. We believe these results come into contrast with those of the 2002 dataset, for two reasons:
(a) the overconﬁdence of the uninformed investors about the future positive direction of the market
which turned out to be unsubstantiated, and (b) the optimistic fundamentals of listed companies in
1999 fostered a bullish movement in prices, as opposed to their serious deterioration that appeared
in the following years.
A value of θ close to zero indicates a possible lack of information-based risk. Given that the
majority of investors participating in the stock rally of the summer of 1999 were uninformed, they
put much more weight on the cost component of the spread rather than on the adverse selection
one. They most probably presumed that none had more information than them, a belief grounded
on the eﬀortless increase of their wealth during this same period: The price of most small stocks
at least doubled during that period. Under this point of view, diﬀerences in the signiﬁcance of θ
can be attributed to the large number of uninformed traders with no previous experience in share
investments. On the contrary, during 2002, there were mainly institutional investors participating
in the same market, more naturally considered as informed traders, consequently upgrading the
role of the asymmetric information component, θ.
Moreover, the decline of pre-tax proﬁts can decrease uninformed trading, since possible ﬁnancial
distress increases the risk that private investors face, pushing them out of the market. Agrawal et
al. (2004) argued that market makers increase the spread of ﬁrms that encounter ﬁnancial problems,
in order to protect themselves in case they trade against an informed trader. In such companies, it
is common to observe a higher proportion of informed traders, as Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997)
showed, due to the fact that they are more able to use sophisticated methods, not available to small
investors, in order to value the companies with greater accuracy. Since, during the 2002 ﬁscal year,
reported pre-tax proﬁts declined by 32%, a larger presence of informed traders was expected and,
hence, the adverse selection component became more signiﬁcant than during the 1999 period.
13The mid-cap FTASE-40 index was created at the end of this period and, precisely on December 8, 1999.
104.2 The volume dependent model
We now turn to an extension of the MRR model, where we explicitly incorporate trade volume
as a factor aﬀecting price change. In particular, we assume that there are two cost components
that must be decomposed. The ﬁrst one (φ) does not depend on the traded volume, while the
second one (κ) depends on the sign traded volume. Similar, we pose that also the adverse selection
component is related to the size of a trade. Following the idea of MRR, we postulate that:
pt = µt + φXt + κ(XtVt)
µt = µt−1 + θVt(Xt − ρXt−1),
where Vt is the number of traded shares. Given this setup, equation 1 now becomes:
pt − pt−1 = θVt(Xt − ρXt−1)+φ(Xt − Xt−1)+κ(XtVt − Xt−1Vt−1)+ut, (3)
If κ turns out to be negative, the total cost (φXt + κ(XtVt)) decreases with the increase of the
traded volume, since the κ(XtVt) component is a function of the signed volume.
Now, let aXt=1 and bXt=−1 be the ask and bid quotes for trade indicator Xt. Then the implied
s p r e a dc a nb em o d e l l e da s :
aXt=1 = µt−1 + θVt[1 − E(Xt|Xt−1)] + (φ + κVt)
bXt=−1 = µt−1 − θVt[1 + E(Xt|Xt−1)] − (φ + κVt)
aXt=1 − bXt=−1 =2 [ Vt(θ + κ)+φ]
The implied spread is an increasing function of the absolute volume Vt, the adverse selection θ and
the φ parameter, while its relation with κ depends on the sign of it.14 If κ< 0, then economies of
scale in trading are produced, as cost decreases with increasing volume.
We chose to model transaction prices as functions of the signed traded volume for obvious
reasons. The investor in an electronic market, required to implicitly supply liquidity through his
orders, will not only consider the direction of the coming trade (a buy or a sell), but also its size.
It is normal to adjust the spread accordingly, narrowing it for small sizes and widening it for large
ones. Although theoretical models suggest expressing the cost component as a linear function of
volume, we adopt a concave (square root) function, since several empirical studies have shown its
advantages. Barra (1997), in the Market Impact ModelTM handbook, argues that, in order to
achieve the best ﬁt between midquote returns and volume, they had to use the one-half power law.
Almgren (2001) postulated that price impact functions were not linear in volume and chose the
power law family, which includes the square root function. Lastly, Hisata and Yamai (2000) also
formulated the market impact as a square root function, when they proposed a methodology for
Liquidity Adjusted Value-at-Risk.
14If Vt=1 and κ=0, this speciﬁcation simpliﬁes to the MRR model.
11We estimate model 3 based on the following implied moment conditions:
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To eliminate outlier eﬀects, we discarded trades with size greater than the 99.5% percentile of their
empirical distribution.15
For robustness, we also estimated the well known Glosten and Harris (1988) speciﬁcation of
intraday price changes, which, in our notation, can be set out as follows:
pt = µt + φtXt
µt = µt−1 + θtXt + Ut
φt = c0 + c1Vt
θt = z0 + z1Vt,
The Ut variable captures both public information and other factors aﬀecting prices. Using the
above equations, the price change can then be estimated as:
pt − pt−1 = α + c0∆Xt + c1∆XtVt + z0Xt + z1XtVt + Ut, (5)
where α is a constant. Like the MRR model, the implied spread is equal to 2(c0+c1Vt+z0+z1Vt),
which equals to twice the sum of the order processing and the adverse selection components. Both
models (3 and 5) describe in a similar fashion the order processing component, since c0 and φ
measure ﬁxed costs, while c1 and κ express the relation between cost and volume. On the other
hand, Glosten and Harris’s equation writes the asymmetric information component by using two
diﬀerent coeﬃcients: (a) z0 measures the part of adverse selection not aﬀected by volume, and (b)
z1 describes the relation with traded volume. In our speciﬁcation (3), we assume z0 =0 . L a s t l y ,
in 5, Glosten and Harris (1988) set ρ = 0, implying that the order ﬂow does not provide information
about the future value of the asset.
4.2.1 Estimation results
Panel A of table 7 presents the GMM estimates of the extended model16, the corresponding
standard errors for each stock subgroup, the p-value of the Wald test, calculated implied spreads











15See Hausman et al. (1992), De Jong et al. (1995, 1996) among others, for similar transaction ﬁltering.
16Panel B of table 7 is similar to Panel B of table 4 and presents summary statistics on the parameters across the
sample stocks. In all cases the average values are too close to the reported one in panel A of table 7 and therefore,
since our main ﬁndings do not alter signiﬁcantly, our analysis will based on those of panel A.
12The last two parameters are calculated for two values of volume: the oﬃcially minimum allowed
trade size and the average number of shares traded during the sample period.
All parameters are statistically signiﬁcant and diﬀer between the four subgroups. In most
cases, the estimates of model 3 are similar to those of the standard MRR one17. Using the average
period volume, implied spreads are slightly smaller. We must not forget, however, that we can
generate the true implied spread by inputting explicitly the number of shares in the model 3. For
subgroups 1, 2 and 3, the average γ is lower than 50%, showing that, here, the cost component
of the spread (φ + κ
√
V ) is more important than the adverse selection one (θ
√
V ). As volume
increases, however, γ rises and, hence, the importance of the cost component decreases, similarly
to Chan (2000). For a small size trade, the market will most probably believe that it has a relatively
low information content and, consequently, it will place more weight on the order processing cost.
On the other hand, if an investor is willing to trade a large quantity of shares, then the adverse
selection risk facing the counterparty will take over, pushing spreads upwards. We calculate the
minimum number of shares causing such a switch to be equal to 602, 1081, 274 and 785 for groups
1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. For these sizes, γ equals to 1/2.
The negative sign of κ also has a clear implication: the order processing component decreases
with volume, while ﬁxed cost component remain unaltered, resulting in economies of scale in
trading. This was somehow expected because, in an order-driven market like the ASE, without
any explicit market makers, ﬁxed costs cannot be regarded as signiﬁcant by the large number of
anonymous order suppliers, who play the role of liquidity suppliers here. Hausman et al. (1992)
reported, on the contrary, diseconomies of scale for their dataset, with an upward sloping price
response function, although at a decreasing rate. Ahn et al. (2002) also observed economies of
scale in their study, with the order handling part dominating the inventory component. We also
ﬁnd that there is a certain amount of shares that makes the cost component disappear that equals
to 2928, 11216, 2759 and 6112 for each subgroup respectively. For larger sizes, the spread is due
solely to asymmetric information, as φ + κ
√
V becomes negative!
Table 8 displays the OLS estimates of the Glosten and Harris equation 5 for all four stock
subgroups, as well as the corresponding standard errors, adjusted using the Newey and West (1987)
procedure.18 We also report the Wald test results and calculate the implied spread and the γ











Estimated implied spreads and gammas for both models (3 and 5) are quite similar. As the
volume, however, increases, implied spreads become larger in our speciﬁcation than the Glosten
et al. one. Like De Jong (1996), the order processing component is more important than the
17We also compute the Adjusted R-squared for both models (equations 1 and 3) in order to evaluate their in-
sample ﬁt. The values of the Adjusted R-squared measure are quite similar and therefore the usefulness of the
augment speciﬁcation will be supported by the ability to calculate the price impact functions in section 5.1 and in
an out-of-sample study of adjusting Value-at-Risk to liquidity in section 5.2.
18For subgroup 1, we have slightly altered the speciﬁcation of 5, assuming that z0 = 0, in order to produce
statistically signiﬁcant parameters.
13adverse selection one, for average traded volumes, with γ ranging from 33% to 43%. Moreover,
the negative sign of c1 – which can be compared to the parameter κ of our model – indicates that
order handling dominates ﬁxed costs, with total costs falling with the number of traded shares. For
subgroups 2, 3 and 4, coeﬃcient c1 is at least four times larger than κ, resulting in a comparative
weakening of the eﬀect of order handling costs.
Table 9 presents the two components of the spread and the proportion of the information eﬀect
for the three speciﬁcations. While the two models that explicitly incorporate volume as a spread-
aﬀecting variable, generate similar estimations, they both diﬀer signiﬁcantly with the standard
MRR model, since they underestimate the adverse selection part and overestimate the cost part
(cf. a similar result by Ahn et al., 2002). In most cases, estimated parameters of model 3 are closer
to those of MRR, yielding smaller biases. We should of course remember that MRR results are
treated as benchmarks, without them being necessarily so.
Table 10 presents the estimated parameters of model 3 using six time intervals. All measures
exhibit the familiar U-shape time pattern throughout the day, except for κ which seems to follow
an inverse U-shape. This may be mean that, as the trading day unfolds, order handling becomes
less important than ﬁxed costs. Generally speaking, all time patterns mentioned in our previous
analysis, are replicated in table 10. For example, in most cases, the average implied spread and the
adverse selection component are smaller than those of the classical MRR model, while costs are
greater. The diﬀerences in the pattern of the cost component (φ+κ
√
Vt) between the subgroups of
high and low priced stocks is mainly due to the new coeﬃcient κ. For the two subgroups with low
priced shares, the increase in the cost component during the day can be attributed to the smaller
eﬀect of order handling, as κ is getting closer to zero, although it remains always negative. This
dominates the decrease of coeﬃcient φ. This pattern reverses in the last 30 minutes of trading,
since the increase in φ, the part of the cost component that does not depend on volume, causes the
overall cost to increase. This may be associated to the risk of maintaining a position overnight. For
high priced stocks (subgroups 1 and 3), this coeﬃcient is more important than κ
√
V , because the
total cost follows the same pattern as φ. For such expensive stocks, the order handling component
is more important than for cheap stocks (subgroups 2 and 4), as the absolute value of κ is always
greater in the former than in the latter group.
5 The usefulness of the augment model
A perfectly liquid market gives the opportunity to investors to buy or sell any amount of stock
without causing any price change. Consequently, in an illiquid market, the main objective of a
trader should be to measure and minimize the transaction costs. Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2003)
stated that here are two kinds of transaction costs in a stock market: explicit ones include general
commissions and fees, and implicit ones, linked to the trading procedure per se and including
bid-ask spreads and price impact. In this paper, we will limit our analysis to implicit execution
costs and order-based measures of liquidity, since the augment model( 3) can directly estimate
them for diﬀerent traded volumes, while it can be used in order to construct a Liquidity Adjusted
Value-at-Risk (L-VaR) measure, as Angelidis and Benos (2006) did, in the attempt to investigate
14its out-of-sample forecasting performance.
5.1 Price impact functions







Such a deﬁnition translates the natural interpretation of “eﬀect of volume on price”: how much
will the transaction price change for large trade sizes? In table 11, we present such a price impact
function for the four stock subgroups and for chosen trade sizes. While in a perfectly liquid market,
we would expect the impact of volume to be nil i.e., such a function to be ﬂat, this is not the case
here. It may even show whether there are any economies or diseconomies of scale in trading. In our
dataset and for all stock subgroups, the downward-sloping curves reveal the presence of economies
of scale, as the percentage of price due to order handling costs decreases with the traded size.
Moreover, according to this criterion, high priced stocks (subgroups 1 and 3) are the most liquid,
since it is in these groups that we observe the minimum price impact for a ﬁxed trade size. This
result is similar to that of Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995), who observed that transactions
costs are negatively related to share price. Hausman et al. (1992) also reported that low priced
stocks were less liquid than high priced ones, since the percentage price impact for a given traded
value was considerably higher.
In order to measure more accurately the “depth” of each stock subgroup, we calculate the
percentage price change for diﬀerent sequences of traded volumes. In table 12, we present how
the price changes when we switch from a buy transaction at time t − 1( r o w )t oas e l lt r a n s a c t i o n
at time t (column) for a range from 1 to 3000 shares. Generally speaking, we ﬁnd that the price
eﬀect is bigger if the ﬁrst trade is small, because the κ(XtVt − Xt−1Vt−1) part of the impact
decreases the total price change (negative κ). By comparing the stock subgroups according to
their capitalization, we observe that, in most of cases, expected price change is higher in mid cap
stocks (subgroups 3 and 4), as Hasbrouck (1991a, b) reported. An interesting point here is that, for
small trade volumes, the percentage change in high priced, middle capitalization stocks is smaller
than that in low priced, high capitalization stocks. This is not, however, the case for large traded
volumes.
5.2 Liquidity adjusted Value-at-Risk
Value-at-Risk19, which refers to a portfolio’s worst outcome likely to occur over a predetermined
period and a given conﬁdence level, does not take into account the risk of liquidating a large
position. However, according to Bangia et al. (1999), VaR can be adjusted to liquidity risk (L1)a s
follows:
L − Va R= Va R+ L1
19For more information on Value-at-Risk, see Dowd (2002).
15Angelidis and Benos (2006) proposed a L-VaR measure by adjusting VaR to liquidity eﬀects, as
follows:
L − Va R= Va R+[ ( θ + κ)
 
V α 
t + φ], (6)
where V α 
t is the α  quantile of the traded volume. Under this framework, the computation of the
L-VaR number is simple and intuitive, as it splits the total risk into a “market” component:
Va R= Pt(1 − e−α σt)( 7 )
and an “liquidity” one ((θ + κ)
 
V α 
t + φ), where Pt is the stock price, α  is the standardized
normal distribution ordinate that corresponds to the chosen VaR conﬁdence level and σt is the
standard deviation of the underlying distribution. Similarly, the L-VaR forecast for the MRR
model (equation: 1) is calculated as:
L − Va R= Va R+( θ + φ)( 8 )
By comparing the measures (equations 6 and 8), the main drawback of 8 is being revealed: irre-
spectively of the chosen VaR conﬁdence level, liquidation factor (θ +φ) remains constant, while in
case of the augment model (6), it changes according to the traded volume quantile (V α 
t ).
In order to evaluate the two L-VaR models, we generate out-of-sample forecasts for each stock
of the four subgroups for a period, ranging from January 2nd, 2003 to March 31st, 2003 (308 trading
days). Table 13 presents the average number of violations20 for each group, for the 99% conﬁdence
level and for three models: a conventional VaR model (equation 7), a MRR L-VaR(equation 8)
and a Volume L-VaR (equation 6) one. In all cases the augment model produces exception rates
closer to the expected number (3.08) than both the other two techniques. Gains from applying
the proposed model are substantial for the low capitalization stocks (Groups 3 and 4), as not even
the MRR adustment is not enough to cover future losses, while based on the volume dependent
speciﬁcation the observed number of violations is close to the theoretical one.
6 Conclusions
This research investigates the bid-ask spread behaviour of the Athens order-driven stock market.
For the 11-month period from February to December 2002, we analyze high frequency transaction
level data for four stock groups, sorted by their average transaction prices and their capitalization.
Although information asymmetry is expected to decrease over the day due to “learning by trading”
process, we report a U-shape pattern for all stocks. Furthermore, the cost component exhibits the
same U-shape pattern only for high-priced stocks, while, for low-priced ones, it is monotonically
increasing during the day. We think this is due to the order handling part of this component,
which is more signiﬁcant in high-priced stocks. This diﬀerence is further analyzed in a volume
dependent structural model, a natural extension of the MRR speciﬁcation. Based on it, we have
strong indications that the adverse selection increases with trade size while the cost component
20A violation occurs if the predicted VaR is smaller than actual, realized losses.
16decreases, a result similar to those of Ahn et al. (2002). For robustness purposes, we also estimate
the Glosten and Harris (1988) model, reaching once again to similar conclusions.
We also test the robustness of such results for another time period from June to August 1999
and provide evidence that the cost component accounted then for more than 98% of the implied
spread. At that time, most investors participating in the market had no information of any kind of
stocks and trading was generated mostly from a herd behaviour. It is natural that, given such an
environment, the importance of adverse selection risk was downgraded by market participants. The
diﬀerences between the two periods are clearly due to the above mass participation of uninformed
traders but also to a rather signiﬁcantly diﬀerent fundamental background of listed companies.
Furthermore, we form two diﬀerent price impact functions in order to investigate the behaviour
of each stock subgroup to large orders. We ﬁnd that, in such an order-driven market, seems to exist
economies of scale in trading, with the ﬁxed cost component being less important than the order
processing cost. High-priced, high-capitalization stocks are the most liquid for both price impact
measures. Generally speaking, there are indications that the price changes of high-capitalization
stocks are less sensitive to trade sizes and transaction sequence. Finally the superiority of the
extended model is demonstrated in an out-of-sample study by calculating a Liquidity Adjusted
Value-at-Risk measure.
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21Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Group Aver. Spr. Spr. SD Trade Intens. % Spread Aver. Size/Trade Time Bet. Trades
FTASE-20
1 0.0368 0.0431 180 0.19 379 99
2 0.0256 0.0159 138 0.38 634 130
FTASE-40
3 0.0720 0.1289 76 0.41 373 236
4 0.0216 0.0140 98 0.63 607 183
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the 4 stock subgroups for the period February to December
2002. Speciﬁcally, presents the average spread (Aver. Spr), the standard deviation of the spread
(Spr. SD), the transaction per day on average (Trade Intens.), the mean spread in terms of bid-ask
midpoint (% Spread), the average size of a trade (Aver. Size/Trade) and the time between trades
(Time Bet. Trades).
Table 2. Non-parametric tests.
Absolute Spread
Observations Median Number above the Overall Median
FTASE-20 Group 1 275,199 0.02 127,272
FTASE-20 Group 2 211,229 0.02 97,518
FTASE-40 Group 3 25,726 0.04 18,162
FTASE-40 Group 4 232,153 0.02 66,888
Whole Sample 744,307 0.02 309,840
Kruskal-Wallis p value:0
Relative Spread
Size Median Number above the Overall Median
FTASE-20 Group 1 275,199 0.14 30,340
FTASE-20 Group 2 211,229 0.32 105,118
FTASE-40 Group 3 25,726 0.25 10,592
FTASE-40 Group 4 232,153 0.53 225,706
All 744,307 0.32 371,756
Kruskal-Wallis p value:0
Table 2: Non-parametric test for the absolute and the relative spread. (Sample period from



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table 4. Panel A. Estimation results of the MRR model.
FTASE-20 Chi-square FTASE-40 Chi-square
Components Group 1 Group 2 p-value Group 3 Group 4 p-value
ρ 0.2932 0.2818 0 0.4276 0.2580 0
SE 2.33E-03 2.53E-03 7.12E-03 2.27E-03
θ 0.0075 0.0048 0 0.0176 0.0047 0
SE 6.49E-05 4.27E-05 5.14E-04 3.30E-05
φ 0.0066 0.0052 0 0.0074 0.0038 0
SE 6.07E-05 4.11E-05 5.22E-04 2.99E-05
Implied Spread 0.0282 0.0200 0.0500 0.0169
γ 53,04% 48,48% 70,54% 54,92%
Panel B. Summary statistics of the MRR model estimates of the parameters for the group members.
Components Group 1 Group 2
Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum
ρ 0.2995 0.4143 0.2067 0.2820 0.3338 0.2238
θ 0.0077 0.0199 0.0043 0.0054 0.0102 0.0027
φ 0.0064 0.0110 0.0054 0.0051 0.0060 0.0040
Group 3 Group 4
ρ 0.4200 0.4242 0.4159 0.2522 0.3022 0.0961
θ 0.0176 0.0191 0.0161 0.0057 0.0090 0.0023
φ 0.0077 0.0095 0.0059 0.0036 0.0074 0.0014
Table 4: Panel A presents the estimation results of the MRR model for the 4 stock subgroups
(sample period from February 4 to December 30, 2002) and reports the p-value of a Wald within-
index subgroup equality test. Panel B presents summary statistics of the MRR model estimates of














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Table 6. Estimation results of the MRR model for the 1999 dataset.
FTASE-20 Chi-square
Components Group 1 Group 2 p-value
ρ 0.3214 0.2155 0
SE 0.0028 0.0039
θ 0.00059 0.00001 0.0133
SE 0.0002 0.00015
φ 0.07165 0.04741 0
SE 0.0005 0.00040
Implied Spread 0.144 0.095
γ 0.82% 0.01%
Table 6: Estimation results of the MRR model for the 2 subgroups of large cap stocks (sample
period from June 1st to August 31st, 1999). The p-value of a Wald within-index subgroup equality
test is also reported.
27Table 7. Panel A. Estimation results of the volume dependent model.
FTASE-20 Chi-square FTASE-40 Chi-square
Components Group 1 Group 2 p-value Group 3 Group 4 p-value
ρ 0.2906 0.2801 0.0018 0.4279 0.2557 0
SE 2.29E-03 2.50E-03 7.00E-03 2.23E-03
θ 0.0003 0.0002 0 0.0007 0.0002 0
SE 2.68E-06 1.61E-06 2.37E-05 1.25E-06
κ -0.0002 -0.0001 0 -0.0003 -0.0001 0
SE 3.55E-06 1.91E-06 2.87E-05 1.42E-06
φ 0.0124 0.0077 0 0.0175 0.0066 0
SE 9.13E-05 5.33E-05 6.14E-04 4.27E-05
Minimum Trade Size 10 10 10 10
Average Trade Size 379 634 373 607
Implied Spread with min size 0.0252 0.0159 0.0376 0.0136
Implied Spread with ave size 0.0267 0.0198 0.0502 0.0165
γ with min size 6.96% 6.40% 12.21% 7.01%
γ with ave size 40.36% 40.92% 55.80% 45.15%
Panel B. Summary statistics of the augment model estimates of the parameters for the group members.
Components Group 1 Group 2
Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum
ρ 0.2918 0.4061 0.1977 0.2757 0.3293 0.2195
θ 0.0003 0.0017 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.0001
κ -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002
φ 0.0124 0.0212 0.0086 0.0074 0.0098 0.0059
Group 3 Group 4
ρ 0.4141 0.4185 0.4097 0.2471 0.2949 0.1075
θ 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001
κ -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003
φ 0.0163 0.0195 0.0131 0.0059 0.0133 0.0029
Table 7: Panel A presents the estimation results of extended model for the 4 stock subgroups
(sample period from February 4 to December 30, 2002). The p-value of a Wald test for diﬀerences
between subgroups for estimated parameters is also reported. Panel B demonstrates summary
statistics of the augment model estimates of the parameters for the group members
28Table 8. Estimation results for the Glosten and Harris speciﬁcation.
FTASE-20 Chi-square FTASE-40 Chi-square
Components Group 1 Group 2 p-value Group 3 Group 4 p-value
c0 0.0139 0.0071 0 0.01613 0.00608 0
SE 6.94E-05 8.79E-05 1.98E-04 6.46E-05
c1 -0.00023 -0.00002 0 -0.00007 -0.00004 0
SE 3.87E-06 3.41E-06 1.01E-05 2.56E-06
z0 - 0.00256 0.00871 0.00280 0
SE - 1.14E-04 2.44E-04 8.58E-05
z1 0.00024 0.00005 0 0.00010 0.00004 0
SE 3.40E-06 4.47E-06 1.30E-05 3.41E-06
Minimum Trade Size 10 10 10 10
Average Trade Size 379 634 373 607
Implied Spread with min size 0.0279 0.0195 0.0499 0.0178
Implied Spread with aver. size 0.0282 0.0208 0.0508 0.0180
γwith min size 5.45% 27.86% 36.17% 32.97%
γwith aver. size 33.15% 36.67% 41.67% 42.68%
Table 8: Estimation results for the Glosten and Harris speciﬁcation for the 4 stock subgroups
(sample period from February 4 to December 30, 2002). The p-value of a Wald test for diﬀerences
between subgroups for estimated parameters is also reported.
Table 9. Comparative results.
FTASE-20 FTASE-40
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Information component
MRR 0.0075 0.0048 0.0176 0.0047
Trade dependent MRR 0.0054 0.0041 0.0140 0.0037
Glosten-Harris 0.0047 0.0038 0.0106 0.0038
Cost component
MRR 0.0066 0.0052 0.0074 0.0038
Trade dependent MRR 0.0080 0.0059 0.0111 0.0045
Glosten-Harris 0.0094 0.0066 0.0148 0.0052
Relative Proportion
MRR 53.19% 48% 70.40% 55.29%
Trade dependent MRR 40.36% 40.92% 55.80% 45.15%
Glosten-Harris 33.15% 36.67% 41.67% 42.68%


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Table 11. Cost impact function.
Groups
Trade Size 1 2 3 4
1 0.058% 0.107% 0.097% 0.178%
10 0.056% 0.105% 0.093% 0.173%
100 0.048% 0.098% 0.080% 0.157%
500 0.035% 0.085% 0.057% 0.129%
1000 0.025% 0.076% 0.039% 0.107%
Table 11: Percentage of the median price explained by the cost component (sample period from





32Table 12. Order ﬂow price impact function.
Group 1. Large cap stocks with price > e10
Vt
-1 -10 -100 -1000 -2000 -3000
1 -0.1180% -0.1193% -0.1235% -0.1366% -0.1446% -0.1507%
10 -0.1157% -0.1170% -0.1211% -0.1343% -0.1422% -0.1483%
100 -0.1082% -0.1095% -0.1136% -0.1268% -0.1347% -0.1408%
Vt−1 1000 -0.0845% -0.0858% -0.0900% -0.1031% -0.1110% -0.1171%
2000 -0.0702% -0.0715% -0.0756% -0.0887% -0.0967% -0.1028%
3000 -0.0591% -0.0605% -0.0646% -0.0777% -0.0857% -0.0918%
Group 2. Large cap stocks with price < e10
Vt
-1 -10 -100 -1000 -2000 -3000
1 -0.2171% -0.2212% -0.2341% -0.2748% -0.2994% -0.3183%
10 -0.2149% -0.2190% -0.2319% -0.2726% 0.2972% -0.3161%
100 -0.2080% -0.2120% -0.2249% -0.2656% -0.2902% -0.3091%
Vt−1 1000 -0.1859% -0.1899% -0.2028% -0.2435% -0.2681% -0.2871%
2000 -0.1725% -0.1766% -0.1894% -0.2301% -0.2548% -0.2737%
3000 -0.1622% -0.1663% -0.1792% -0.2199% -0.2445% -0.2634%
Group 3. Mid cap stocks with price > e10
Vt
-1 -10 -100 -1000 -2000 -3000
1 -0.1997% -0.2083% -0.2353% -0.3207% -0.3725% -0.4122%
10 -0.1957% -0.2042% -0.2312% -0.3166% -0.3684% -0.4081%
100 -0.1828% -0.1913% -0.2184% -0.3038% -0.3555% -0.3952%
Vt−1 1000 -0.1421% -0.1507% -0.1777% -0.2631% -0.3148% -0.3546%
2000 -0.1175% -0.1260% -0.1530% -0.2384% -0.2902% -0.3299%
3000 -0.0986% -0.1071% -0.1341% -0.2195% -0.2713% -0.3110%
Group 4. Mid cap stocks with price < e10
Vt
-1 -10 -100 -1000 -2000 -3000
1 -0.3611% -0.3673% -0.3870% -0.4491% -0.4868% -0.5157%
10 -0.3561% -0.3623% -0.3820% -0.4442% -0.4818% -0.5107%
100 -0.3404% -0.3466% -0.3662% -0.4284% -0.4660% -0.4949%
Vt−1 1000 -0.2905% -0.2967% -0.3164% -0.3785% -0.4162% -0.4451%
2000 -0.2603% -0.2665% -0.2862% -0.3483% -0.3860% -0.4149%
3000 -0.2371% -0.2433% -0.2630% -0.3251% -0.3628% -0.3917%
Table 12: Percentage price changes from trade reversals of diﬀerent sizes (sample period from
February 4 to December 30, 2002.
33Table 13. Average number of violations for the four subgroups.









Table 13: Out-of-sample average number of violations for each group and for the 99% conﬁdence
level of the three risk models: VaR (equation 7), MRR L-VaR (equation 8) and a Volume L-VaR
(equation 6). The out-of-sample period is from January 2nd, 2003 to March 31th, 2004.
34